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Summary 
 
This paper uses time-series and panel data regressions to investigate the impact of 
decentralization on economic growth in Canada for the 1961-2004 period. Evidence 
suggests that decentralization has contributed positively to growth in some provinces, but 
aggregated data do not present clear evidence of a significant impact. The paper first 
presents a theoretical framework for decentralization and growth by explaining different 
approaches and details a theoretical model of endogenous growth, with output growth 
rate expressed as a function a global tax rate and subnational government share of total 
expenditure. This is followed by a review of previous studies.  After a brief historical, 
political and economic overview of the Canadian federation, econometric specifications, 
variables and data are then explained, followed by the presentation and discussion of the 
regressions’ results. Explanations are offered as well as a discussion for future research 
possibilities. 
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Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this research paper is to determine the impact fiscal 
decentralization has had on economic growth in Canada for the 1961-2004 period. This 
question is of interest since decentralization is seen as a way to promote efficiency in the 
public sector, to increase competition between subnational governments and therefore 
contribute to economic growth.1 The debate on devolution and fiscal subnational 
autonomy has also been revived in developed federations like the United States, Australia 
Germany and Canada.2 However, empirical investigations have not yet given a definitive 
answer to the question of the impact of decentralization on development and economic 
growth. For these reasons, this research topic is important and it still needs to be a 
concern for researchers and governments alike. 
 
In order to provide an answer to our initial question, the paper is set up as follows: 
chapter 1 provides the theoretical framework in which decentralization and its relation 
and impact on growth are to be understood. In order to do so, we will review the different 
schools of thought on the benefits and drawbacks on decentralization. We will then 
review the current state of the literature on decentralization and growth by examining five 
previous studies related to our subject of interest. Chapter 2 introduces a brief summary 
of the Canadian federation, its history and economic, demographic and political 
characteristics and an overview of the evolution of subnational government finance. We 
also detail empirical investigation and analysis. Starting with our econometric 
specifications, estimation technique and variable definitions, we then describe the data 
we used for our analysis. Several important remarks are made on the source and content 
of our data which will help in processing correctly the information retrieved from 
Statistics Canada’s CANSIM II data bank.  
 
Chapter 3 provides the presentation and discussion of our regressions results and 
links them to the theoretical predictions made in the previous section of our paper. The 
                                                 
1 See for example, Xie, Zou & Davoodi(1999) World Bank(2001) and Bahl & Linn(1992) 
2 Xie & al.(1999) p.229 
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conclusion is followed by Annex 1 which gives the calculus details of our endogenous 
growth model, and Annex 2, which details the results of our provincial time-series 
regressions.  
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Chapter 1 – Theoretical framework 
 
1.1 Decentralization: definitions 
 
Decentralization, like intergovernmental relations is a complex phenomenon. It 
involves many political and legal arrangements and it is no easy task to quantify levels of 
responsibility and decision-power. In order to clarify the subsequent discussion about 
decentralization, it is useful to distinguish between the usual broad institutional 
arrangements found in most federations. The following table presents an overview of 
three types of decentralization arrangements.  
 
Table 1.1  
Three aspects of three types of decentralization 
Type Political authority Implementing authority Funding authority 
Deconcentration National elected representatives 
Central government 
officials National budget 
Delegation 
National and local 
elected 
representatives 
Local government 
officials supervised 
by central 
government 
officials 
Local budget, with or 
without contractual 
payments by central 
government, taken 
from the national 
budget 
Devolution Local elected representatives 
Local government 
officials (including 
groups of central 
government officials) 
Local budget, taxes or 
central government 
transfers from the 
national budget 
Source:  Gauthier and Vaillancourt (2002). 
  
While deconcentration is simply the presence of administrative agencies or offices 
of the central government located in the regions, delegation occurs when the central 
government retains authority and responsibility of funding and service delivery, but 
delegates the implementation and administration to lower levels of government. Finally, 
the term devolution which is regarded as true decentralization is used when the central 
government retains no rights to oversee and monitor the quality, quantity and mode of 
delivery of public services. Subnational elected governments are entirely responsible to 
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their own electorate for all aspects of these services. Rosembaum defines devolution as 
follows: “genuine decentralization consists in the delegation of responsibilities and 
resources to relatively independent and autonomous infra-national authorities which are 
answerable not to central government but to the citizens of the region or community3.”   
With these definitions in mind, we will consider for the remainder of this paper 
devolution when talking about decentralization. The next section will present different 
theoretical approaches to decentralization.  
  
1.2 Theoretical approaches 
 
 The relationship between decentralization and growth rests on the premise that 
decentralization may or may not lead to a more efficient public sector. Indeed, there are 
two theoretical approaches to the impact of decentralization on efficiency. The normative 
public economics approach, which includes the work of authors such as Musgrave(1997) 
and Zodrow and Mieszkowski(1986), holds that decentralization leads to inefficient 
allocation of resources, regressive taxes and inadequate public service levels for the 
poorest members of society4. The view is that the loss of economies of scale and the 
externalities inherent in the decisions taken by local and subnational governments result 
in inadequate budgets. Furthermore, fiscal competition and a highly mobile tax basis at 
subnational levels forces governments to reduce their supply of goods and services and to 
use benefit taxes. These taxes are considered regressive in that they don’t rest in tax-
payers’ ability to pay, which are more redistributive. A second approach termed the 
public choice approach holds that governments pursue their own interests and seek to 
maximize their revenue, and that competition between governments is a necessary 
constraint designed to impose discipline. According to Tiebout(1956) and Brennan and 
Buchanan(1980), competition is seen as an important mechanism to encourage efficiency 
in taxation, regulation and supply of goods and services. Moreover, decentralization 
provides society with such a mechanism.  
 
                                                 
3 Rosenbaum (1998), p. 509. 
4 Oates and Schwab (1991), p. 127. 
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 However, when it comes to actual governance and policy implementation, the 
question is not as much should we decentralize, but rather how, how much and what 
should we decentralize. To this question, two authors have provided answers still 
regarded today as sound principles in the fiscal federalism literature. Richard A. 
Musgrave in his 1959 book The theory of public finance distinguished three types of 
government interventions and indicated which level of government should be responsible 
for their implementation. These were macroeconomic actions, redistributive actions and 
microeconomic actions. Oates(1972) improved on these principles by further defining the 
scope of microeconomic interventions and proposed rules for the distribution of 
authority. First, macroeconomic actions which consist of fiscal and monetary policies 
should be taken care of by the central government because of the need for coordination 
and stability. Furthermore, macroeconomic actions are believed to be ineffective at the 
subnational level because of economic “leakages” associated with local and provincial 
expenditure.5 However, subnational governments could act as agents on request of the 
central government by taking measures to stimulate investment for example. Second are 
the redistributive actions, for which it is considered more efficient for the central 
government to be responsible, especially when there is important population mobility.  
 
For the third type of government action, microeconomic interventions, it is 
considered appropriate for subnational governments to play a role in their supply and it 
was Oates who set the rules, known as the decentralization theorem,6 that should apply to 
the sharing of responsibilities in this area. Microeconomic actions, which consist of all 
the other public services and goods provided by governments, from roads, to parks, to 
hospitals and schools, should be the responsibility of the center or the subnational levels 
depending on 4 factors: the potential economies of scale, the heterogeneity of the 
population, the externalities from one jurisdiction to the other and on the possibility of 
competition and emulation between governments. In the presence of economies of scale, 
it is naturally considered to be more efficient for the central government to supply the 
particular good. The more variety in preferences for quantity, quality and type of goods in 
                                                 
5 Martinez-Vazquez(2003) p.1599 
6 Meloche & al.(2004) p.2 
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the population or geographically concentrated groups, the more decentralization in public 
services provision should occur. Canada is a fine example with the presence of Québec, a 
predominantly French-speaking and historically catholic province in a predominantly 
English-speaking and protestant country. The third rule on externalities says that the 
more we find externalities in the production of public services, the more production 
should be centralized in order to internalize them to ensure an optimum level. Finally, the 
fourth rule in determining the level of responsibility of microeconomic actions is the 
potential for innovation in production. The greater the possibility to produce different 
types of public goods and services or to produce them in different ways, the more 
production should be decentralized. From these rules, it appears that each government 
intervention must be evaluated distinctly in order to determine which level of government 
should be responsible, thus the questions of how and what in decentralization. After 
reviewing the existing theory on decentralisation, the next section will address the issue 
of its impact on economic growth, by setting up a model of endogenous growth.   
 
1.3 Endogenous growth model 
 
Following Barro(1990) and Xie, Zou & Davoodi(1999), we will setup a 
theoretical model of fiscal decentralization and economic growth in order to frame our 
empirical investigation for Canada. While Barro’s model introduced government 
expenditure in the production function of an endogenous growth model, Xie & al. 
improved it by detailing three levels of government. We will do the same here by 
defining these levels as the federal, provincial and local levels. Decentralization will 
therefore be represented as a higher share of subnational (provincial and local) 
government spending on total government spending. The production function is Cobb-
Douglas, with k representing the level of private capital stock, which can be considered as 
a measure of both human and physical capital. Total government spending g is divided in 
the three components f, p and l, federal, provincial and local government spending on 
goods and services respectively (we only consider spending that enters in the production 
function, therefore ignoring transfers and debt-service). The variables are all measured on 
a per capita basis. 
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ωγβα lpfky =       (1.1) 
glpf =++       (1.2)  
with ( )1,0,,, ∈ωγβα  and 1=+++ ωγβα  
  
Total government spending is allocated as follows 
gf fθ= , gp pθ= , gl lθ= ,   (1.3) 
where 1=++ lpf θθθ  and ( )1,0∈iθ  for lpfi ,,= .  
 
We have therefore the federal government’s share of total expenditure fθ , provincial 
government’s share pθ and local government's share lθ . Consolidated government 
spending is financed by a flat income tax at a rate τ , which we will assume constant. We 
also make the further assumption of a balanced growth path, i.e. the government will not 
run any deficits or surpluses.  
     yg τ=       (1.4) 
  
 To determine the long-run growth rate of the economy, we need to analyze the 
consumption and investment decisions made by the individuals. We consider one 
representative agent facing an infinite planning horizon who maximizes his discounted 
utility subject to his dynamic budget constraint (1.6) and the government’s budget 
allocation (1.4). He takes as given the government’s announcement of the fix tax rate and 
the spending by the different levels of governments. The representative agent’s 
preferences have the following form 
    dtecU tρ
σ
σ
−∞
−∫ − −= 0
1
1
1      (1.5) 
where c is per capita private consumption and ρ is a positive time discount rate.  
 
The dynamic budget constraint is given by the equation 
   ( ) ( ) clpfkcy
dt
dkk −−=−−=≡ ωγβαττ 11&    (1.6) 
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 The individual chooses his optimal consumption path ( ){ }0: ≥ttc  and his 
investment path to determine the level of capital stock ( ){ }0: ≥ttk . To find this optimal 
allocation of resources by the individual, we write down the Hamiltonian7 
( )[ ]clpfkecH t −−+− −= −
−
ωγβαρ
σ
τλσ 11
11  
where λ is a dynamic Lagrange multiplier.  
 
By differencing on c and k we find the first order conditions 
00 =−⇒=∂∂ −− λρσ teccH     (1.7) 
( ) λατλλ ωγβα && −=−⇒=+∂∂ − lpfkkH 110    (1.8) 
 
Using the transversality condition 0lim =−∞→
t
t
ek ρλ , the budget constraint (1.6) and 
by fixing the initial capital stock to ( ) 10 =k , we can find the growth rate of the economy.8 
( )( )( )
σ
ρθθθσ
ττα αωαγαβαα −−−=
−
lpfy
y
1
11&    (1.9) 
  
Equation (1.9) shows that the long-run growth rate of per capita output is a 
function of the tax rate and the spending shares of the different levels of government. 
Thus, we see that the government can influence the growth rate of the economy by 
choosing among different spending shares for the federal, provincial and local levels. If 
the government’s objective is to maximize this growth rate, it will do so by choosing the 
spending shares that maximize (1.9). They are determined by the optimization of 
equation (1.9) under the constraint 
1=++ lpf θθθ     (1.10) 
 
By setting up the Lagrangian  
                                                 
7 See Barro & Sala-i-Martin(2004) p.604 for a derivation of first-order conditions in a dynamic 
optimization problem 
8 See Annex 1 for calculus details 
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( ) ( )1,,, −++−⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −∆= lpflpflpfL θθθλσρθθθλθθθ αωαγαβ  
with ( )( )
( )
σ
ττα αα−−−≡∆
1
11  
we find the first-order conditions 
00
1 =−∆⇒=∂∂ ∗∗
−∗ λθθθα
β
θ
αωαγαβ
lpff
L   (1.11) 
00
1 =−∆⇒=∂∂ ∗
−∗∗ λθθθα
γ
θ
αωαγαβ
lpfp
L   (1.12) 
00
1 =−∆⇒=∂∂
−∗∗∗ λθθθα
ω
θ
αωαγαβ
lpfl
L   (1.13) 
010 =−++⇒=∂∂ ∗∗∗ lpfL θθθλ     (1.14) 
 
From these, we can deduce the growth-maximizing spending shares of the federal, 
provincial and local governments. 
ωγβ
βθ ++=
∗
f , ωγβ
γθ ++=
∗
p , ωγβ
ωθ ++=
∗
l  
 
Following Xie & al., we interpret these ratios as measures of the productivity of 
public spending by each level of government on aggregate productivity of federal, 
provincial and local government spending.9 Hence, growth can be increased with a 
reallocation of government expenditure if the shares by the different levels are not those 
corresponding to the ratios above. It is to be noted that total government expenditure as a 
share of GDP needs not to be increased or decreased to do so. This result provides an 
interesting framework for the analysis of our empirical data by showing that the 
relationship between decentralization and growth is not a clear one and thus we could 
find either a positive association between the two, when spending assignment correspond 
to these theoretical growth-maximizing ratios, but also negative correlation when they 
differ from them. Knowing that expenditure responsibilities are determined by many 
political, historical and cultural factors other than strict economic efficiency, we cannot 
                                                 
9 Xie & al.(1999) p.232 
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predict the sign of our decentralization coefficients for our regression. It can be expected 
to find both results in our empirical investigation depending on the level of 
decentralization.  
 
From the previous discussion, it appears that no clear theoretical predictions can 
be made in regards to the impact of decentralization on growth. Some authors would 
argue that it is detrimental to economic growth, because of the loss of coordination and 
economies of scale, while some others would consider that the presence of 
intergovernmental competition should positively contribute to efficiency in public service 
delivery and thus, to long-term growth. Similarly, while we have expressed the growth 
rate of the economy as a function of the shares of aggregated government spending, we 
know that these shares are determined by many non-economic factors and therefore, may 
not be at optimal levels. The following section will cover the literature review on the 
subject of decentralization and growth and how it has been studied in other countries of 
the world. 
 
1.4 Review of previous studies 
 
 Interest in the impact of decentralization on growth is recent in the literature on 
fiscal federalism. However, there have been many attempts in the last few years to 
quantify this relationship, but no final consensus has been reached among specialists. We 
will review here five of those studies who have investigated the subject. These were 
chosen based on the similarities between the method and subject of their investigation 
and the purpose of this paper.10  
 
Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal 
Decentralization, Huther and Shah(1998)  
 
Before reviewing the work done directly on the question of decentralization and 
growth, we will cover a paper by Huther and Shah(1998) on decentralization and quality 
                                                 
10 This section is not a comprehensive review on the question of decentralization’s impact on economic 
growth. For a more complete review see Martinez-Vazquez & McNab(2003).  
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of governance. In their cross-country study the authors devised a composite index of 
governance for a sample of 80 countries, developed, developing and in transition. They 
controlled for a large number of governance features like political freedom and stability, 
judicial and bureaucratic efficiency, absence of corruption, human development, equality 
of income distribution, openness to international trade, central bank independence and 
inverted debt to GDP ratio.11 Their data on decentralization used subnational government 
expenditure. The authors used correlation analysis to evaluate the relationship between 
decentralization and good governance. Among their results, they found that 
decentralization was significantly and positively correlated with bureaucratic efficiency, 
lower corruption, a higher Human Development Index (HDI) score and a positive link 
between the invert of debt to GDP ratio, although this last result, using a Pearson 
correlation coefficient was not statistically significant. Although the authors did not 
measure the correlation between decentralization and growth, the study is interesting in 
that it helps us to understand how decentralization may contribute to economic growth. It 
seems from their results that it has been a positive factor in the development of sound 
social, judicial, political and economic institutions, which are important factors for long-
term growth. However, some problems arise with their approach as they used somewhat 
very broad measures taken from limited surveys and involving subjective judgments. The 
choice of the weights associated with each measure is also subject to debate. In using 
correlation analysis instead of regression analysis, the authors did not control for 
important variables that affect decentralization and quality of governance. Their results 
might therefore be biased, in addition to not capturing the causality link between the two 
variables.  Finally, their data on fiscal decentralization fails to represent the complexity of 
the many institutional arrangements found in such a diverse sample of countries. 
Therefore, we need to be careful in interpreting their results.  
 
Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study, Davoodi and 
Zou(1998) 
 
                                                 
11 Huther & Shah(1998) p.3 
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In the second study reviewed, Davoodi and Zou(1998) use a panel data to directly 
determine the effect of decentralization on economic growth. They collected data on 46 
developed and developing countries over the 1970-1989 period. Their decentralization 
indicators used subnational share of total government expenditure. Using regression 
analysis, the authors controlled for the total tax burden on the economy, population 
growth, human capital, initial per capita GDP and investment. They did find significant 
coefficients for their decentralization variables, but only for developing countries and 
those coefficients were relatively low and negative. Although the authors used a large 
sample of countries for a relatively long period of time, one problem with their approach 
is the strong heterogeneity of their sample. The great divergences between countries like 
the United States and Malawi or Germany and Bolivia make comparisons difficult and 
probably induce major variable omissions. Another problem with their study is the one-
dimension of their decentralization indicator, which fails to capture the complexity of the 
phenomenon. Therefore this research paper makes use of 6 different decentralization 
indicators, measured with different approaches like revenue, overall and categories of 
spending as well as autonomy.  
 
Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in the United States, Xie, Zou and 
Davoodi(1999)  
 
Xie, Zou and Davoodi(1999) used for their research time-series data for the 
United States on decentralization and GDP growth. Using variables such as the global tax 
burden, labor growth rate, investment, a measure of the economy’s openness to 
international trade, an average tariff rate, the inflation rate, the Gini coefficient and an 
index of energy prices, they ran 16 regressions over the 1949 to 1994 period. Their 
decentralization measures consisted of state and local government spending shares or 
subnational (state and local) government spending share. They found only one significant 
coefficient associated with local spending in all of their 16 specifications. Although focus 
on one country has enabled them to isolate more accurately the effects of decentralization 
on growth, it seems that their measure of decentralization still fails to capture the 
complexity of the phenomenon. Government fiscal data in the United States, contrary to 
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most developing countries are very detailed and reliable. Failing to measure more precise 
indicators of real subnational government autonomy and level of authority, for example 
by taking into account federal grants to states and municipalities, has kept the authors 
from pushing their investigation further. 
 
Decentralization or Fiscal Autonomy? What Does Really Matter?, Meloche, Vaillancourt 
and Yilmaz(2004)12 
 
 In this paper, the authors evaluated the impact of decentralization on growth for 
10 European transition countries using new data made available by the OECD. This data 
improves on the Government Finance Statistics provided by the IMF by including 
information on the level of autonomy of local governments in terms of both revenue and 
expenditure. The GFS statistics had been used for most studies on decentralization and 
growth, but the authors claimed it did not provide adequate information on actual local 
government autonomy and responsibility levels. They included in their analysis 8 
measures of decentralization and subnational autonomy on both the revenue and spending 
sides. Controlling for initial level of GDP per capita, population growth, school 
enrollment and investment, they found a positive and significant impact of subnational 
non-tax autonomy and total revenue autonomy on growth. They also found a negative 
and significant relationship between subnational fiscal dependency and growth, which is 
an indication of the benefits of decentralization. They also ran regressions of the size of 
the public sector on their measures of decentralization and found positive and significant 
relationship between autonomy and public sector size. The authors did improve on 
previous studies by their use of more accurate decentralization and autonomy indicators. 
However, their limited sample, both in terms of number of countries and observations, 
did not produce very robust results.   
 
Fiscal decentralization contributes to economic growth: evidence from state-level cross-
section data for the United States, Akai and Sakata(2002) 
                                                 
12 This paper is an extension of a previous study by Robert D. Ebel and Serdar Yilmaz(2002), On the 
Measurement and Impact of Fiscal Decentralization. 
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Following Davoodi and Zou(1998) in their cross-country and panel approach, but 
focusing like Xie & al.(1999) on the United States data, Akai and Sakata(2002) measured 
the impact of fiscal decentralization on state economic growth. They ran a cross-section 
regression for the 50 states with the dependant variable being the average per capita state 
GDP growth over the 1992-1996 period. Their control variables were the average annual 
growth rate of the state’s GDP over the preceding 4-year period, the percentage of high 
school graduates in total 18-24 years population, a variable indicating the share of seats 
in state legislature held by Democrats in 1992, the Gini coefficient, a dummy variable 
indicating if the state was in the southern region, the state’s share of total US patents, an 
openness to trade indicator. An interesting innovation on their part was the fact that they 
used 5 indicators of decentralization. Along with the usual measure of local government 
expenditure as a share of total government expenditure in the state (analogue to 
subnational expenditure on total expenditure found in national studies), they also used a 
revenue indicator, the ratio of local government revenue to local and state government 
revenue. Another indicator was the average of both preceding variables along with two 
indicators of local government fiscal autonomy. These were computed as the ratio of 
local government’s own revenue to total revenue, both with and without federal grants. 
This last distinction was not very relevant, the indicators showed a 0.993 correlation 
coefficient and it did not yield any interesting empirical results.  
 
The authors did find statistically significant and positive coefficients associated 
with their decentralization indicators. Both their revenue and expenditure indicators had 
significant coefficients between 0.14 and 0.22 depending on the specification. However, 
their autonomy indicators did not have statistically significant results. Despite their 
results and conclusions, one draw-back in the authors’ paper is the fact that they limited 
themselves to cross-section analysis and a 2-period panel, therefore missing valuable 
information on the evolution and long-term impact of decentralization on growth.  
 
 After reviewing these studies which give us a good overview of the current state 
of our knowledge on the impact of decentralization on economic growth, we are able to 
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point to the shortcomings of the present literature and improve on what’s been done 
already. From what we’ve seen, the major weaknesses of previous studies have been the 
use of simple measures of decentralization failing to capture the complexity of the 
phenomenon. Most studies have simply used the share of subnational expenditure on total 
government expenditure, but this indicator may fail to capture actual authority and 
responsibility over the sums spent. Another problem with cross-country studies is the fact 
that it is very difficult to control for historical, cultural and institutional differences which 
have an important impact on a country’s long-term growth rate. Most studies using cross-
sectional data also fail to capture the long-term relationship between decentralization and 
growth and this might prove to be quite important. Institutional variables may take some 
years to actually impact on the economy’s growth rate and this cannot be detected in 
cross-section studies. Finally, no study has comprehensively investigated the relationship 
between decentralization and growth at both the national and subnational level for a 
single country. Therefore, there is still a need to present a full account of this important 
institutional characteristic. Following is a table summarizing the studies and results 
described above.   
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Table 1.2 
Decentralization and growth: review of existing studies  
Study Description Conclusions 
Huther et Shah(1998) Decentralization and governance, 
cross-section (1980-83) sample of 
80 countries 
Decentralization is 
correlated with bureaucratic 
efficiency, absence of 
corruption and higher score 
on the Human Development 
Index 
Davoodi et Zou(1998) Decentralization and growth, 
panel of 46 countries for the 
1970-1989 period 
Negative relation between 
decentralization and 
economic growth pour 
developing countries 
Xie, Zou and Davoodi 
(1999) 
Decentralization and growth, 
time-series for the United States 
for the 1949-1994 period 
No statistically significant 
relation between 
decentralization and growth 
Meloche, Vaillancourt 
et Yilmaz(2004) 
Decentralization, economic 
growth and public sector size, 
cross-section (of 10 European 
transition countries, 2001-02) 
Significant impact of  
subnational fiscal autonomy 
on growth and public sector 
size, but no impact of 
expenditure decentralization 
Akai and Sakata(2002) Decentralization and state 
economic growth, cross-section 
and 2-period panel for the United 
States (1988-96) 
Positive and significant 
impact of revenue and 
expenditure decentralization 
on state economic growth 
Source: compilation by the author 
 
After reviewing the current state of the literature, the next section will present the 
theoretical framework of our research question by presenting different approaches and 
models of decentralization and intergovernmental competition and by setting up a 
theoretical model of endogenous growth. In the next section, we will try to provide an 
answer to the question of the impact of decentralization on growth for the Canadian 
context during the 1961-2004 period. We will present the econometric specifications and 
the data used to do our regressions. 
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Chapter 2 – Empirical analysis 
 
2.1 The Canadian federation 
 
Since this research paper will focus on decentralization in the Canadian federation 
for the period from 1961 to 2004, it is important in order to better understand the 
implications of our question to have a broad understanding of the Canadian context in its 
economic, political, demographic and historical components. Canada is a federation of 10 
provinces and three territories. Its Constitution, the British North American Act, dates 
back to 1867 and the country was founded on the premise of a strong central 
government.13 The federal government was given access to the most important revenue 
source in use then, custom duties and had responsibility over economic development 
affairs like railroads, the banking sector, commerce and tariffs, etc. Provinces were left 
with areas of responsibility that were not very important then, namely matters such as 
health care, education and social services. Important social changes and a growing 
implication of government in all areas of society have been behind the much more active 
part played by provincial governments in the last century. On the revenue side, provinces 
were given by the Constitution and its judicial interpretation the right to tax anything they 
wanted except international and inter-provincial trade.14 They have done so increasingly 
in the last century. In 1913, the federal government had 3.5 times the total revenue 
provinces had. In 1921, after World War I and in great part because of the important 
wartime expenditures, Ottawa collected 4.3 times as much as the provincial governments. 
After the Second World War however, provincial governments started catching up with 
the centre and their share steadily climbed until the 70’s, where it has remained stable at 
approximately 50% of total government revenue, more than 2.5 times the federal share.15 
As for local governments, they mainly consist of municipalities and school boards. While 
school boards have constitutional status, municipal governments have always been under 
provincial control since they are not mentioned in the Constitution. Provinces thus have 
total freedom to determine their boundaries, their taxing powers and areas of 
                                                 
13 Vaillancourt & Wingender(2005) p.4 
14 Ibid. p.5 
15 Bird(1983) series H75-91 and H92-112 and CANSIM II, table 380002 
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responsibilities. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 give the shares of revenue and spending by all levels 
of government since 1961. We can see that while local governments in Canada have 
maintained a stable share of both revenue and expenditure around 18% and 30% 
respectively, since 1961 the federal shares have declined from 40 to 20% for revenues 
and from a near 50% to 38% in 2004 for spending. In contrast, provincial revenue has 
increased from 30% to more than 45% and provincial spending went from 30% in 1961 
to 55% now.  
 
Figure 2.1 
Evolution of revenue shares by level of government 1961-2004 
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Source: CANSIM II, table 3800022 
 
Figure 2.2 
Evolution of expenditure shares by level of government 1961-2004 
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Source: CANSIM II, table 3800022 
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 The composition of provincial revenue has also changed significantly since 1961. 
Intergovernmental transfers, mostly from the federal government, represented 30% of 
provincial revenues in 1961, but in 2004 these transfers amounted to only 15% of total 
revenue. Provinces have mainly relied on their own-tax revenue to keep up with 
expenditure growth. Local governments, which are much more dependant on transfers, 
have seen those increased in terms of share of total revenue while their own-tax revenue 
declined during the same period. Following in figure 2.3 and 2.4 are the evolutions of 
provincial and local government revenue composition for the 1961-2004 period. 
 
Figure 2.3 
Evolution of provincial government revenue 1961-2004 
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Source: CANSIM II, table 3800022 
 
Figure 2.4 
Evolution of local government revenue 196-2004 
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While it is straightforward to cover different aspects of decentralization for 
Canada, it is more difficult to do so for individual provinces. Provinces have very diverse 
municipal structures and they vary greatly in terms of the number of municipalities and 
their legal status. Therefore, we will keep the discussion on provincial decentralization 
for a subsequent section of this paper, when we will present the data. We now end this 
section with an overview of Canada’s current situation. Key economic, demographic and 
geographic variables are presented in table 2.1 and provide us with a useful background 
for evaluating the importance and impact of decentralization of the country’s and its 
provinces economic growth. As we can see, Canadian provinces are very diverse in terms 
of size, population and per capita GDP. While Prince-Edward-Island is the smallest and 
“poorest” province in the federation along with the other Atlantic provinces, Ontario and 
Alberta are the richest. These two provinces are also the ones receiving from Ottawa the 
least transfers, with 11.7% and 8.7% respectively of total provincial revenue. The next 
section presents our empirical models and the data used. 
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Table 2.1 
Demographic, economic and geographic features of Canada and its provinces, 2003 
Sources: Vaillancourt and Wingender(2005), Finance of the Nation 2003 and compilation from CANSIM II by the author 
  Canada NFD PEI NS NB QUÉ ONT MAN SASK ALTA BC 
Area (km²) 9,984,670 405,212 5,660 55,284 72,908 1,542,056 1,076,395 647,797 651,036 661,848 944,735 
Population (‘000) 31,630 520 138 936 751 7,487 12,238 1,163 995 3,154 4,147 
Population density 3.2 1.3 24.4 16.9 10.3 4.9 11.4 1.8 1.5 4.8 4.4 
GDP ($000,000) 1,214,601 18,015 3,883 28,813 22,358 254,263 493,416 38,078 36,778 170,631 142,418 
GDP per capita 38,400 34,644 28,138 30,783 29,771 33,961 40,318 32,741 36,963 54,100 34,342 
Total provincial government 
revenue ($000,000) 
235,032 4,618 1,079 7,025 5,953 63,488 77,887 9,243 8,522 25,933 29,101 
% revenue from own sources 84.2 60.9 66.7 71.3 67.6 84.6 88.3 73.8 81.5 91.3 85.5 
% transfers 15.8 39.1 35.3 28.7 32.4 15.4 11.7 26.2 18.5 8.7 14.5 
Total local government 
revenue ($000,000) 
84,575 941 213 1,612 1,161 16,051 32,593 2,452 2,098 8,013 8,263 
% revenue from own sources 59.6 25.0 20.2 50.7 32.0 51.3 59.6 50.4 65.7 44.4 43.7 
% transfers 40.4 75 79.8 49.3 68.0 48.7 40.4 49.6 34.3 55.6 56.3 
Number of municipalities  - 289 75 55 103 1141 446 199 545 199 153 
Number of school boards - 11 3 7 0  72 72 37 99 64 60 
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2.2 Econometric specifications 
 
For the purpose of our research, the impact of decentralization on Canadian 
economic growth has been analyzed with three different approaches. Data gathered for 
the 10 Canadian provinces for the 1965-2004 period was evaluated using 10 time-series 
regressions and 2 panel data regressions, one including all 10 provinces and a second 
using a subset of the 6 largest provinces (with the exclusion of the 4 Atlantic provinces). 
A time-series analysis has also been conducted for aggregated Canadian data. The 
ordinary least squares technique was used in order to evaluate the impact of 
decentralization of output growth. Our first set of provincial regressions used the 
following equation 
tttt Xzationdecentraliy εβαα +++=∆ 10ln , t = 1,…, 39 (5.1)  
 
where t is a time index. Definitions of the variables of the equation are given in table 5.1. 
Decentralization is a measure of decentralization captured by one of the 6 indicators used 
for our provincial data, with higher values associated with higher levels of 
decentralization. We chose our different indicators based of the work done in previous 
studies. Definitions of these indicators are given in table 5.1. Two important 
specifications need to be made. First, we chose to use data on government spending for 
goods and services only because we wanted to keep in line with our theoretical model 
and capture the impact of productive spending only. This way, government spending did 
not contain transfer payments or debt service. Second, data for school board expenditure 
was the total spending, because classifications by Statistics Canada did not have the same 
goods and services series as for governments. tX is a vector of control variables typically 
used in growth studies to captured province-specific characteristics.16 The parameters 0α  
and 1α are scalars, β represents a parameter vector and tε  is the error term, which may 
be serially correlated and/or correlated with some of the independent variables. However, 
because of the limited size of our sample and the difficulty of finding appropriate 
                                                 
16 See for example Devarajan & al.(1996) or Levine & Renelt(1992) 
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instrumental variables, we chose to ignore this potential correlation/autocorrelation and 
use a simple basic OLS.  
 
In our provincial time-series regression, data for output growth rate has been 
collected from 1965 to 2003 while all the other variables have been compiled starting in 
1961 and ending in 1999. This 4 year lag was chosen because of the availability of the 
data and because it produces the best results in terms of explanatory power. In addition, 
this 4-year lag ensures us that the relationship between growth and the independent 
variables is unidirectional, i.e. that economic growth as we measured it did not affect the 
independent variables used in our analysis. It also allows us to capture more long-term 
effects that changes in the institutional variables may have on growth.17  
 
A second set of regression analysis has been done with the aggregated provincial 
data using a panel form. We computed two alternative regressions, the first one using all 
10 provinces and the second one using only the 6 largest provinces (excluding the four 
Atlantic provinces). The specification differs slightly from the previous one in individual 
provincial data. The regression equations are as follow 
( ) ttttit yearyXsationdecentraliy µδδβαα +++++=∆ 3110 0ln   (5.2)  
i = 1,…, 10 and 1,…, 6 and  t = 1,…, 8 
 
   
where i refers to one of the 10 provinces in the first panel and to the 6 largest provinces 
(Québec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia) in the second 
regression sets and t refers to the 8 5-year periods selected. For these regressions, the 
dependant variable is no longer the annual growth rate of provincial per capita GDP, but 
is a 5-year forward-looking average of this variable. This 5-year average is interesting to 
use because it allows us to capture both short-term and long-term effects of our 
institutional and macroeconomic variables on growth. We were able to construct 8 sub-
periods from 1962 to 2004 with all independent variables measured in the base year. The 
                                                 
17 It would be an interesting extension of this paper to test for the presence of unit root or cointegration in 
the variables used in our provincial time-series regressions. 
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5-year average dependant variable and the independent variables were computed as 
follow 
tt yyy lnlnln 4 −=∆ +    with tzationdecentrali and tX measured at time t 
 
We also added in the regression the log of the initial level of provincial GDP 
ln ( )0y  and (8-1) time dummy variables tyear . Using Hausman’s test which tests the null 
hypothesis of random-effects for panel variables against fixed-effects, we failed to reject 
the null hypothesis in all but one panel regressions. We therefore did not include any 
provincial dummy variables in the panel regressions, considering a random-effect 
specification. Results of these Hausman tests are given in table 3.2 and 3.3. Finally, the 
error term tµ  is assumed to be serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated to the explanatory 
variables. 
 
It is to be noted that for each of the regressions, we included alternatively the 
different indicators of fiscal decentralization. Decentralization is a complex phenomenon 
which involves many legal and political arrangements between different levels of 
government. Simple quantitative budgetary measures cannot easily capture true 
responsibility and decision-making over important governance questions, like power to 
tax, expenditure responsibility and regulation for example. Our five indicators can 
therefore provides us with a more accurate picture of the impact decentralization has had 
in Canada in the last 40 years.  
 
We also analyzed aggregated data for Canada over the 1961-2004 period. The 
econometric specification is similar to what we did with provincial data. Treating Canada 
as one jurisdiction, we used a time-series analysis to run the following regression18 
tttt Xsationdecentraliy εβαα +++=∆ 10ln ,          t = 1, …, 43 (5.3) 
 
                                                 
18 As noted by one of our readers and similar to the provincial regressions, further tests on the presence of 
unit root and cointegration would be required in order to verify the implicit assumptions of stationarity 
made here. 
 29
While we included a measure of the economy’s openness to international trade in 
this regression, a key variable in most growth analysis papers, we could not use the same 
measure for our provincial data. The reason was the unreliability of provincial export data 
in CANSIM. Because interprovincial borders are not monitored in Canada, Statistics 
Canada is not able to compile accurate data. For Canadian data however, it was important 
to include this measure as a control variable.  
 
The decentralization indicators differ from the provincial case. Unlike the 
previous analysis, subnational decentralisation can either be provincial or local. It was 
therefore important to separate measures of revenue and spending between the two levels, 
along aggregated indicators. Another difference between provincial and national 
regressions was the use of an indicator of the economy’s openness to trade. While it was 
straightforward for the national level, we simply used the ratio of goods and services 
exports on GDP; we had to use a different indicator for provincial level. The reason for 
this is that data for provincial exports is compiled in CANSIM as a residual category of 
GDP calculations; it is therefore not computed directly. This introduces error in exports 
data, we therefore decided to use as a proxy the share of provincial GDP to national GDP 
by making the assumption that the larger the province, the lower are its exports’ share of 
GDP.  Following in table 2.1 are given the variables’ description and the regressions in 
which they were used. Means and standard-deviations for the dependant and control 
variables are found in Annex 3. The reader may refer to table 2.4 and section 2.1 for the 
evolution of decentralization indicators at the provincial and national levels. 
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Table 2.2 
Variables definition 
Source: compilation by the author 
Variable Definition Provincial 
time-series 
Provincial
panel 
National 
time-series
tyln∆    Annual growth rate of real per capita output ●  ● 
tyln∆  5-year forward-looking average annual growth rate of 
real per capita output  ●  
)0(ln y  Logarithm of real per capita provincial output for initial 
year  ●  
TXRT Ratio of total consolidated government revenues to GDP ● ● ● 
EXPEND Ratio of total government expenditure in goods and 
services to GDP ● ● ● 
∆POP Annual growth rate of population ● ● ● 
EDUC Share of post-secondary education expenditure on total 
government expenditures   ● ● ● 
INV Ratio of total private investment to GDP ● ● ● 
OPEN Ratio of goods and services exports to GDP   ● 
OPEN(2) Share of the provincial GDP to national GDP ● ●  
Fiscal decentralisation indicators 
RI Ratio of total local government revenue to local and 
provincial government revenue ● ●  
PROVREV Ratio of provincial government revenue to total 
government revenue   ● 
LOCREV Ratio of local government revenue to total government 
revenue   ● 
SNREV Ratio of subnational government revenue to total 
government revenue   ● 
PI Ratio of local (municipal + school board) government 
expenditure in goods and services to local and provincial 
government expenditure 
● ●  
PRI Arithmetic average of RI and PI indicators ● ●  
PROVEXP Ratio of provincial government expenditure in goods and 
services to total government expenditure    ● 
LOCEXP Ratio of local government expenditure in goods and 
services to total government expenditure    ● 
SNEXP Ratio of subnational government expenditure in goods 
and services to total government expenditure    ● 
MUNI Ratio of municipal government expenditure in goods and 
services to total government expenditure  ● ● ● 
SCHOOL Ratio of school boards total expenditure to total 
government expenditure (goods and services) ● ● ● 
AI Ratio of local government’s own revenue to total revenue ● ● ● 
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2.3 The data 
 
 Data were taken from Statistics Canada’s CANSIM II database. Table 2.2 lists the 
tables used from CANSIM II to retrieve the data necessary for this paper.  
 
Table 2.3  
CANSIM II Tables 
Table number                                          Table Title 
 Provincial data 
510005 Estimates of Population, Canada, Provinces and Territories 
3840001 Gross domestic product (GDP), Income-based, Provincial Accounts 
3840002 Gross domestic product (GDP), expenditure-based, provincial economic 
accounts 
3840004 Government sector revenue and expenditure, provincial economic accounts 
3840015 Provincial Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Expenditure-based 
3840022   Federal Government and Government Sector Revenue and Expenditure 
3840023  Provincial Government Revenue and Expenditure 
3840024 Local Government Revenue and Expenditure 
4780001 Total Expenditure on Education, by Direct Source of Funds and Type of 
Education 
4780010 School Board Revenues, by Direct Source of Funds 
4780012 School Board Expenditures, by Economic Classification 
 National data 
3800017 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Expenditure-based 
3800022 Sector Accounts, All Levels of Government 
3800040 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Expenditure-based 
3850001 Consolidated Federal, Provincial, Territorial and Local Government 
Revenue and Expenditure, for Fiscal Year Ending March 31 
Source: author 
 
 A few important remarks need to be made on the data involved in this research 
paper. First of all, due to their historical nature, it was necessary to compute observations 
for most provincial series from two different tables. Provincial GDP series were found for 
the 1961-1991 period in table 3840015 Provincial Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
Expenditure-based and for the 1981-2004 period in the table 3840002 Gross domestic 
product (GDP), expenditure-based, provincial economic accounts. When divergences 
occurred between the two data sets, which we found was usually between 1 and 5%, we 
used the observations compiled in the latest of the two tables. Consolidated provincial 
budgetary series were also compiled from two different tables. Total government revenue 
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series, used to calculate the TXRT variable, a global measure of the tax burden of a 
provincial economy, were taken from tables 3840022 Federal Government and 
Government Sector Revenue and Expenditure and 3840004 Government sector revenue 
and expenditure, provincial economic accounts. Since all amounts were in nominal 
terms, we used provincial GDP in current dollars to calculate most ratios. Provincial 
nominal GDP series were found in table 3840015 for 1961-1991 and table 3840001 
Gross domestic product (GDP), Income-based, Provincial Accounts for 1981-2004. The 
variable EXPEND, the spending equivalent of TXRT used in regressions with 
expenditure-type decentralization indicators, was compiled with national account series 
taken from tables 3840015 and 3840002. Similarly, the variable INV, the ratio of private 
investment in fixed capital and machines to GDP used data from the same national 
account series for both sub periods. To compute ∆POP, the annual growth rate of total 
population, we used single series since the data was accessible for 1954 to 2004. Finally 
for series on spending in post-secondary education by all levels of government used to 
compute EDUC, a proxy for human capital in each province, data was taken from table 
4780001 Total Expenditure on Education, by Direct Source of Funds and Type of 
Education up to 1999, the last year data was compiled by Statistics Canada for this 
expenditure category. This constraint was one of the reason we used 4 lags on 
independent variables for our provincial regressions.  
 
Data used for the decentralization indicators (RI, PI, MUNI, SCHOOL, PRI and 
AI) for local and provincial government expenditure had to be disaggregated between the 
two levels and were only accessible on CANSIM II up to 2002. Data on local government 
revenue and expenditure for 1961-1991 were taken from table 3840024 Local 
Government Revenue and Expenditure and table 3840004 for 1981-2004. Local 
government expenditure was divided between general spending and school board 
expenditure. This was done in order to capture the potentially different effects of these 
two categories. While we could suspect general local government spending to be 
positively correlated with growth, due to greater proximity to local needs and greater 
sensitivity to government competition, school board expenditure should be negatively 
correlated with growth due to the benefits of greater coordination and economies of scale. 
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This is in accordance with Oates’ 4 rules for decentralization. Municipal governments 
face a high level of heterogeneity in the public services they offer, therefore favouring 
more decentralization. Taxpayers may also benefit from increased competition between 
municipalities. On the other hand, we could suspect a relatively high homogeneity in 
people’s preferences for schools and important economies of scale in school systems.  
We will try to identify these effects in the subsequent section on our regressions analysis.  
 
Another issue concerning school board revenue and expenditure had to be dealt 
with specifically for Newfoundland. We found that Statistics Canada did not compile 
local government budgetary data the same way it did for the rest of Canadian provinces. 
In Newfoundland’s case, the Total Revenue series (V503369) found in table 3840024 
Local Government Revenue and Expenditure did not include for the 1961-1991 period 
school board revenue, while the corresponding series for 1981-2002, Local Government; 
Total Revenue (V689577) from table 3840004 did contain those amounts. The 
explanation is that school boards in Newfoundland are operated by religious organization 
and not by the government. The result was a near 14 point jump in local government 
revenue between 1980 and 1981. We therefore had to add to the older series Total 
Revenues (V1025855) from table 4780010 School Board Revenue, by Direct Source 
Funds. The same correction had to be made on the expenditure side since the 1961-1991 
data did not contain school board expenditure, while the 1981-1991 series did contain it. 
Finally, our indicator of local government autonomy AI also had to be adjusted to take 
into account this change. Not only did we have to modify data on local government 
revenue, but we also had to add transfers from provincial government to school boards to 
transfers from provincial to local government. 
 
A similar observation needs to be made for New Brunswick. The province 
underwent a reform of its education system in 1967 and with it, came the abolition of 
school boards.19 Consequently according to the data, local government revenue had a 
60% drop from 1966 to 1967. The reason was school board revenue was no longer 
                                                 
19 Provincial Finances 1967, p.107 
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compiled at the local level, but at the provincial level and this is why the provinces 
presents such a different decentralization profile than other provinces in Canada.  
 
One final correction had to be made with provincial data. Observations on 
provincial government spending for goods and services from table 3840004 Government 
sector revenue and expenditure, provincial economic accounts for 1981-2002 has been 
compiled in CANSIM II with school board expenditure included. The older data for 
1961-1991 did not include these amounts, so we found a very large gap between the two 
series. We made the correction by subtracting school board expenditure from provincial 
expenditure in the new series. 
 
National data was much simpler to work with. Single series could be found for the 
whole period we were concerned with, except for data on education expenditure. 
Therefore, for most series no adjustments were needed in order to use the data directly 
from CANSIM II. As for education, the data was needed to compute the decentralization 
indicators MUNI, spending by municipal governments and SCHOOL, spending by school 
boards as well as EDUC, our proxy for human capital, measured by government spending 
on higher education as a share of total government spending. Data was accessible on 
these spending categories for 1954-2000 in table 4780001 Total Expenditure on 
Education, by Direct Source of Funds and Type of Education and for 1989-2004 in table 
3850001 Consolidated Federal, Provincial, Territorial and Local Government Revenue 
and Expenditure, for Fiscal Year Ending March 31. We combined both series to have 
government spending on both higher education as well as school board expenditure for 
the whole 1961-2004 period. Finally, all independent variables were included in the 
regressions with a one-year lag except EDUC and INV, which were both included with 5-
year lags, which provided us with the most significant regression results. 
 
To end this section, we present in table 2.4 decentralization indicators for the 10 
provinces calculated in various years to present each province’s profile and its evolution 
over time.   
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Table 2.4  
Fiscal decentralization by province and indicators for selected years 
Province Year RI PI MUNI SCHOOL PRI AI 
NFD 1962 0.18 0.31 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.31 
 1972 0.21 0.46 0.08 0.38 0.34 0.18 
 1982 0.21 0.38 0.07 0.32 0.30 0.20 
 1992 0.19 0.39 0.12 0.27 0.29 0.25 
 2000 0.19 0.30 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.23 
PEI 1962 0.19 0.42 0.03 0.38 0.31 0.50 
 1972 0.16 0.36 0.03 0.32 0.26 0.15 
 1982 0.16 0.4 0.09 0.31 0.28 0.14 
 1992 0.17 0.32 0.05 0.27 0.25 0.14 
 2000 0.17 0.3 0.08 0.21 0.24 0.20 
NS 1962 0.31 0.51 0.10 0.42 0.41 0.66 
 1972 0.27 0.49 0.12 0.37 0.38 0.49 
 1982 0.28 0.45 0.15 0.30 0.37 0.35 
 1992 0.26 0.41 0.16 0.25 0.34 0.39 
 2000 0.21 0.39 0.18 0.22 0.30 0.48 
NB 1962 0.31 0.51 0.13 0.38 0.41 0.60 
 1972 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.39 
 1982 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.47 
 1992 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.59 
 2000 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.72 
QUE 1962 0.39 0.69 0.19 0.50 0.54 0.69 
 1972 0.32 0.59 0.16 0.43 0.46 0.49 
 1982 0.28 0.47 0.17 0.29 0.38 0.41 
 1992 0.27 0.41 0.18 0.23 0.34 0.5 
 2000 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.23 0.32 0.54 
ONT 1962 0.46 0.73 0.29 0.44 0.60 0.60 
 1972 0.38 0.61 0.20 0.40 0.50 0.52 
 1982 0.36 0.61 0.26 0.35 0.49 0.54 
 1992 0.38 0.59 0.24 0.36 0.49 0.55 
 2000 0.31 0.57 0.25 0.32 0.44 0.58 
MAN 1962 0.42 0.68 0.29 0.39 0.55 0.72 
 1972 0.32 0.53 0.16 0.37 0.43 0.56 
 1982 0.30 0.46 0.18 0.28 0.38 0.47 
 1992 0.26 0.44 0.16 0.28 0.35 0.47 
 2000 0.22 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.32 0.52 
SASK 1962 0.37 0.68 0.28 0.40 0.53 0.66 
 1972 0.30 0.57 0.18 0.39 0.44 0.62 
 1982 0.28 0.44 0.17 0.27 0.36 0.53 
 1992 0.24 0.44 0.17 0.27 0.34 0.54 
 2000 0.20 0.41 0.18 0.23 0.31 0.67 
ALTA 1962 0.45 0.65 0.18 0.47 0.55 0.59 
 1972 0.35 0.57 0.16 0.40 0.46 0.54 
 1982 0.26 0.47 0.19 0.28 0.37 0.5 
 1992 0.29 0.45 0.18 0.27 0.37 0.55 
 2000 0.21 0.44 0.18 0.26 0.33 0.46 
BC 1962 0.38 0.60 0.19 0.41 0.49 0.62 
 1972 0.33 0.52 0.15 0.37 0.43 0.59 
 1982 0.28 0.44 0.17 0.27 0.36 0.49 
 1992 0.25 0.41 0.16 0.25 0.33 0.37 
 2000 0.20 0.38 0.17 0.21 0.29 0.46 
Source: compilation from CANSIM II by the author 
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From the preceding table, we can see that Ontario stands out as being the most 
decentralized province in Canada. All decentralization indicators except AI, a measure of 
local government autonomy, rank highest for the most populated Canadian province. On 
the other hand, the least decentralized province as revealed by our indicators is Prince-
Edward-Island. It is also the smallest and least populated province, which is somewhat 
not surprising to find. Finally, there seems to be a clear downward trend in 
decentralization in Canada according to all indicators. 2000 levels are on average 30% 
lower than 1962 levels. Following is a correlation matrix of our 6 provincial indicators. 
 
Table 2.5 
Correlation coefficients of fiscal decentralization indicators, 1961-2000 
 RI PI MUNI SCHOOL PRI AI 
RI - - - - - - 
PI 0.815 - - - - - 
MUNI 0.167 0.310 - - - - 
SCHOOL 0.809 0.951 0.064 - - - 
PRI 0.899 0.982 0.273 0.943 - - 
AI 0.513 0.439 0.082 0.435 0.474 - 
     Source: compilation from CANSIM II by the author 
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Chapter 3 – Empirical Results  
 
 Results for the provincial time-series regressions are found in Annex 2, we will 
provide here a summary of significant results. One important observation is the larger the 
province, the more explanatory power independent variables had in our regressions. A 
good measure of this explanatory power is adjusted R-square which has low values for 
some of the provinces. In particular, regressions for Prince-Edward-Island all yield 
negative values of this statistic. In fact, we do not find any significant variable in the 7 
regressions. Table 3.1 gives a summary of significant results found in our provincial 
time-series regressions. 
 
Table 3.1  
Statistically significant regression results, provincial time-series 1965-2004 
 Source: compilation by the author 
 
As we can see from the previous table, significant results can be found in 6 of the 
10 provinces. From these results, it seems that decentralization has mostly contributed to 
provincial economic growth. Except for New Brunswick, which has a very high 
coefficient (in absolute terms) associated to the MUNI indicator, all the coefficient above 
indicate that the more revenue and expenditure were handled by local government 
Regression Indicator Coefficient Sign. level Max adj. R² Min adj. R² 
NFD - - - 0.08 0.04 
PEI - - - -0.02 -0.07 
NS PI 0.29 5% 0.09 0.22 
 MUNI 0.69 10% - - 
 SCHOOL 0.33 5% - - 
NB MUNI -1.46 10% -0.02 -0.10 
QUE - - - 0.25 0.32 
ONT SCHOOL 0.59 5% 0.20 0.30 
MAN RI 0.79 10% 0.08 -0.01 
 PRI 0.47 10% - - 
SASK RI 1.13 5% 0.15 0.02 
 PI 0.57 5% - - 
 MUNI 1.30 5% - - 
 PRI 1.29 5% - - 
ALTA - - - 0.20 0.17 
BC RI 0.70 5% 0.19 -0.05 
 PRI 0.88 1% - - 
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officials, the better was the economic performance. The effects of decentralization seems 
to have been relatively stronger in Saskatchewan, where an additional percentage point of 
municipal expenditure as a share of total government expenditure was associated with a 
0.013 percentage point increase in the province GDP growth rate. Also, we did not obtain 
negative coefficient for the variable SCHOOL like we hypothesized. In all three cases 
where the variable had a significant coefficient, the value was positive. After running 
time-series regression for individual provinces, we compiled data in order to run panel 
regressions, first using observations for all 10 provinces and then only using the 6 largest 
provinces (excluding the smaller Atlantic provinces). Results for these two regressions 
are given in tables 3.2 and 3.3 below.  
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Table 3.2 
Regression results for provincial panel data 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
Dependant variable : 5-year forward-looking average per capita GDP growth rate 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PIB(0) 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [-0.08] [-0.39] [-0.93] [-0.91] [-0.21] [-0.31] [-0.07] 
TXRT -0.26 - - - - -0.25 -0.26 
 [-2.42]** - - - - [-2.33]** [-2.49]** 
SPENDTOT - -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 - - 
 - [-2.32]** [-2.41]** [-2.46]** [-2.34]** - - 
RI 0.00 - - - - - - 
 [-0.08] - - - - - - 
PI - 0.01 - - - - - 
 - [0.64] - - - - - 
MUNI - - 0.08 0.07 - - - 
 - - [1.07] [1.13] - - - 
SCHOOL - - 0.00 - 0.01 - - 
 - - [-0.19] - [0.39] - - 
PRI - - - - - 0.01 - 
 - - - - - [0.40] - 
AI - - - - - - 0.00 
 - - - - - - [-0.06] 
∆POP -0.05 -0.04 0.13 0.11 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 
 [-0.19] [-0.15] [0.40] [0.35] [-0.23] [-0.16] [-0.2] 
EDUC 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.04 
 [0.48] [0.75] [0.95] [0.98] [0.65] [0.67] [0.51] 
INV -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 [-0.41] [-0.57] [-0.85] [-0.84] [-0.48] [-0.51] [-0.39] 
OPEN -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 [-0.44] [-0.43] [-0.76] [-0.74] [-0.39] [-0.44] [-0.43] 
Time1 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 [-0.64] [-0.73] [-1.10] [-1.08] [-0.65] [-0.70] [-0.53] 
Time2 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 [-2.10]** [-2.22]** [-2.41]** [-2.44]** [-2.15]** [-2.19]** [-1.86]* 
Time3 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 [1.18] [1.04] [0.65] [0.69] [1.14] [1.07] [1.10] 
Time4 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 [-1.84]* [-1.87]* [-2.05]** [-2.05]** [-1.83]* [-1.86]* [-1.80]* 
Time5 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 [-3.35]*** [-3.30]*** [-3.42]*** [-3.48]*** [-3.27]*** [-3.32]*** [-3.34]*** 
Time6 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 [-4.27]*** [-4.24]*** [-4.31]*** [-4.34]*** [-4.23]*** [-4.24]*** [-4.26]*** 
Time7 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 [-1.10] [-1.16] [-1.30] [-1.29] [-1.12] [-1.15] [-1.11] 
CONS 0.15 0.17 0.28 0.27 0.15 0.17 0.15 
 [1.26] [1.52] [1.74]* [1.79]* [1.40] [1.44] [1.04] 
Adj. R-square 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Hausman test 3.99 6.48 6.81 6.06 4.91 4.95 4.50 
P-value 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Obs. 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
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Table 3.3 
Regression results for provincial panel data (6 provinces) 
Dependant variable : 5-year forward-looking average per capita GDP growth rate 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PIB(0) -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 [-1.09] [-1.13] [-1.24] [-1.32] [-0.98] [-1.08] [-1.06] 
TXRT -0.63 - - - - -0.30 -0.37 
 [-3.34]*** - - - - [-1.60] [-2.34]** 
SPENDTOT - -0.26 -0.24 -0.29 -0.34 - - 
 - [-1.70]* [-1.57] [1.91]* [-2.20]** - - 
RI -0.30 - - - - - - 
 [-2.18]** - - - - - - 
PI - 0.20 - - - - - 
 - [2.28]** - - - - - 
MUNI - - 0.29 0.24 - - - 
 - - [2.14]** [1.79]* - - - 
SCHOOL - - 0.16 - 0.11 - - 
 - - [1.59] - [1.10] 0.10 - 
PRI - - - - - [0.65] - 
 - - - - - - - 
AI - - - - - - 0.00 
 - - - - - - [-0.01] 
∆POP 0.45 0.58 0.72 0.74 0.37 0.46 0.43 
 [1.19] [1.51] [1.73]* [1.74]* [0.91] [1.13] [1.02] 
EDUC 0.09 0.26 0.31 0.30 0.15 0.20 0.16 
 [0.55] [1.63] [1.83]* [1.70]* [0.95] [1.14] [0.93] 
INV 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
 [-0.06] [-0.67] [-0.96] [-0.91] [0.02] [-0.22] [-0.08] 
OPEN 0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 
 [1.70]* [-1.71]* [-1.89]* [-1.24] [-0.51] [-0.52] [0.04] 
Time1 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
 [-1.18] [-1.79]* [-1.70]* [-1.29] [-1.43] [-1.29] [-1.17] 
Time2 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
 [-2.05]** [-2.92]*** [-2.73]*** [-2.27]** [-2.46]** [-2.29]** [-2.18]** 
Time3 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 [0.48] [-0.63] [-0.34] [0.30] [-0.39] [-0.15] [0.06] 
Time4 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 [-1.96]** [-2.28]** [-1.90]* [-1.47] [-2.06]** [-1.85]* [-1.76]* 
Time5 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
 [-3.50]*** [-3.63]*** [-3.56]*** [-3.49]*** [-3.52]*** [-3.48]*** [-3.39]*** 
Time6 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 [-3.74]*** [-3.09]*** [-2.96]*** [-3.04]*** [-3.26]*** [-3.09]*** [-3.25]*** 
Time7 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 [0.44] [-0.33] [-0.38] [-0.42] [-0.30] [-0.45] [-0.34] 
CONS 0.66 0.36 0.38 0.48 0.42 0.43 0.49 
 [2.12]** [1.17] [1.24] [1.57] [1.30] [1.30] [1.52] 
Adj R-square 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.74 
Hausman test 33.5 8.91 10.07 12.83 14.14 7.49 8.12 
P-value 0.00 0.84 0.82 0.54 0.44 0.91 0.88 
Obs 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
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While we obtained much more significant results and a better-fitting overall 
econometric specification, the impact of decentralization on growth is not as clear as in 
the individual provincial cases. None of the regressions using all 10 provinces yielded 
significant results for the decentralization indicators used. A problem with this approach 
is that it gives an equal weight to all provinces, while in reality not all provinces are 
equal. It certainly does not reflect the Canadian economic situation, when we consider for 
example the fact that Ontario’s economy is 127 times the size of Prince-Edward-Island.20 
We therefore ran another panel regression with only the central and western provinces 
(see table 3.3.). This time, four regressions provided significant results with RI, the ratio 
of total local government revenue to local and provincial government revenue, negatively 
associated with growth. PI, the expenditure indicator was positively associated with 
growth and once again, MUNI was a positive factor in explaining economic growth with 
a fairly higher coefficient.  
 
 We finally ran time-series regressions on aggregated Canadian data for the period 
from 1961 to 2004.  Results of these regressions are given in table 3.4 below. The results 
once again do not show a clear effect of decentralization on growth. While LOCREV, the 
ratio of local government revenue to total government revenue is positively associated 
with growth, PROVEXP, provincial government spending in goods and services to total 
government spending in goods and services is negatively correlated to growth. The 
SNEXP indicator, subnational spending as a share of total government spending, has a 
similar coefficient due to the fact that it is the sum and both local provincial data, i.e. 
LOCEXP and PROVEXP. Other measures of decentralization do not seem to have 
affected the Canadian economy’s growth rate over the period of study, as we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis stating a 0 coefficient. 
 
From the information gathered in our regressions, it seems that decentralization in 
Canada did have an impact on provincial economic growth for some of the provinces. 
However, its impact on national GDP growth cannot be conclusively determined based 
on our results. The fact that our results are inconclusive reflects both the theoretical 
                                                 
20 CANSIM II, series V687545 and V687409 
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models described earlier and also many of the previous studies. While some positive 
associations between decentralization and growth have been found, the opposite results 
have also been observed, for example in the similar study by Xie, Davoodi and 
Zou(1999) on the United States.    
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Table 3.4 
Regression results for national data 1961-2004 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
Dependant variable : per capita GDP growth 
Indep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
TXRT -0.36 -0.39 - - - - - -0.42 
 [-1.98]* [-2.14]** - - - - - [-2.41]**
SPENDTOT - - 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.6 0.69 - 
 - - [1.27] [1.14] [1.28] [1.16] [1.41] - 
PROVREV -0.23 - - - - - - - 
 [-0.77] - - - - - - - 
LOCREV 0.85 - - - - - - - 
 [1.79]* - - - - - - - 
SNREV - 0.13 - - - - - - 
 - [0.58] - - - - - - 
PROVEXP - - -0.67 -0.68 -0.67 -0.66 - - 
 - - [-2.10]** [-2.02]* [-2.54]** [-2.46]** - - 
LOCEXP - - -0.02 - - - - - 
 - - [-0.05] - - - - - 
MUNI - - - -0.06 -0.05 - - - 
 - - - [-0.08] [-0.06] - - - 
SCHOOL - - - -0.02 - 0.00 - - 
 - - - [-0.04] - [0.00] - - 
SNEXP - - - - - - -0.68 - 
 - - - - - - [-2.05]** - 
AI - - - - - - - -0.36 
 - - - - - - - [-1.49] 
∆POP -1.47 1.40 -3.29 -3.30 -3.26 -3.25 -2.63 1.71 
 [-0.56] [0.67] [-1.31] [-1.29] [-1.37] [-1.34] [-1.03] [0.95] 
EDUC 0.42 0.14 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.12 -0.26 
 [1.51] [0.60] [0.84] [0.78] [0.80] [0.83] [0.42] [-0.73] 
INV -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.17 0.07 
 [-0.18] [0.09] [0.17] [0.18] [0.26] [0.19] [-0.91] [0.38] 
OPEN 0.19 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.25 
 [2.36]** [1.84]* [1.86]* [1.84]* [2.22]** [2.00]* [2.01]* [2.29]**
CONS 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.37 0.32 
 [0.21] [0.14] [0.61] [0.56] [0.77] [0.97] [1.78]* [1.95]* 
Adj. R-square 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.14 
Obs. 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to determine the effect of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth in Canada for the 1961-2004 period. This question is of interest for 
public finance experts and practitioners in Canada and all over the world. Fiscal 
imbalance is being publicly debated in Canada, while provinces ask for more revenue and 
autonomy to face climbing spending needs in health and social matters. Decentralization 
is also a subject of interest for governments worldwide, especially in developing 
countries where it is seen as a way to improve government efficiency and contribute to 
economic development. In order to bring an answer for the Canadian case, we first 
summarized in chapter 1 the theoretical underpinnings of the relationship between 
decentralization and growth by briefly exposing the different schools of thought on the 
effects of decentralization, intergovernmental competition, efficiency and growth. We 
also set up an endogenous growth model which presented output growth as a function of 
subnational government spending share. We then reviewed the current state of the 
empirical literature on decentralization and growth and proposed ways to improve on 
what has already been done. The criticisms were concerned with the often limited 
measures of decentralization in the studies reviewed. Three out of five studies simply 
used subnational shares of total government spending. For our research, we improved on 
this by using 6 decentralization indicators and also by detailing local government areas of 
responsibilities. Assuming different effects of decentralization for school board and 
general municipal government expenditure, we divided local spending between these two 
indicators. Another concern with previous studies is the fact that they used heterogeneous 
cross-country samples. By doing so, authors were not able to control for important 
historical, cultural and institutional factors that also affected economic growth. The use of 
Canadian data assured us that our jurisdictions were similar in terms of institutions and 
history and we could therefore efficiently isolate the role played by decentralization. 
Finally by analyzing data at the provincial and national levels, we were able to 
comprehensively study the implications of decentralization for a given country, 
something which had not been done yet.  
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In chapter we provided the reader with a brief overview of the Canadian federation 
and we then presented our empirical analysis by detailing the econometric specifications, 
the variables and the data used  
Finally we presented in chapter 3 the results of our regression analysis. The answer to 
our question is not clear and simple. We can say that overall, decentralization seems to 
have contributed positively to growth in the last 40 years in Canada, but the evidence is 
not unequivocal. Out of our 70 single provincial time-series regressions, we did find 13 
statistically significant coefficients for our decentralization indicators, of which only one 
was negative. Municipal government expenditure in New Brunswick seems to have 
affected growth negatively and the coefficient obtained was fairly high: a 1% increase in 
the share of municipal expenditure on total government expenditure in the province 
resulted in a 0.0146% decrease in the province’s output growth rate. This however is not 
surprising given the different structure of the province’s local governments. Using 
provincial data, we compiled the observations in order to run panel regressions. We first 
used observations for all 10 provinces and then only used data from the 6 largest. Here, 
the results were less convincing. We obtained three significant and positive coefficients, 
but the values were lower than in our provincial regressions. Our MUNI indicator 
provided the best results, in accordance with our previous hypothesis that general 
municipal expenditure would benefit more from decentralization than school board 
expenditure. Our spending indicator PI was positive and significant in one regression, but 
the revenue indicator was also negative. Thus, results from our panel regressions propose 
a less convincing case for decentralization and growth. Finally, using aggregated national 
data, we ran time-series regression for 1961-2004. Local government revenue as a ratio 
of total government revenue was positive and significant in one regression, but provincial 
spending was negatively correlated to growth for all specifications. To summarize, if 
decentralization seems to have had an impact on growth at the provincial level, any 
aggregation of the data seems to modify this relationship. The overall portrait of 
decentralization in Canada is therefore ambiguous and not very conclusive.  
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 As for future research areas, one could be the determination of an optimal level of 
decentralization. Since no clear conclusion did emerge from our analysis, a reason may 
be that different levels of decentralization have different impacts on growth. 
Decentralization would be desirable until a certain optimal level, after which it would be 
detrimental to growth. It would therefore be an interesting research question to find the 
optimal level of decentralization for Canada and the provinces. Another way to improve 
on this work would be to detail even further the composition of subnational government 
revenue and expenditure. We have obtained interesting results by dividing local 
government data between municipal and school board data, so improving on the data’s 
preciseness could reveal more of the role played by decentralization. Another important 
extension to this paper would be to test the hypothesis made for the econometric models, 
like unit root, cointegration, endogenous variables, etc. Finally, if our analysis was on the 
contribution of decentralization to growth, we did not investigate how it did affect 
economic growth. Further research would be required to explore the mechanisms 
involved in this complex relationship.   
 
 47
Bibliography 
 
Akai, Nobuo and Masayo Sakata. "Fiscal decentralization contributes to economic 
growth: evidence from state-level cross-section data for the United States", Journal of 
Urban Economics, 52, 2002, 93-108 
 
Bahl, Roy and Johannes F. Linn. Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries, New 
York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1992 
 
Barro, Robert J. "Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth", 
Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1990, S103-S125.  
 
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. Economic Growth. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2003.   
 
Bird, Richard M. "Section H: Government Finance" in Historical Statistics of Canada, 
1983, http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/11-516-XIE/sectiona/toc.htm. 
 
Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan. Power to Tax: Analytical Foundation of a 
Fiscal Constitution”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980. 
 
Canadian Tax Foundation. Provincial Finances 1967, Toronto, 1968. 
 
____________________. Finance of the Nation 2003, Toronto, 2004 
 
Davoodi, Hamid and Heng-fu Zou. "Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: A 
Cross-Country Study", Journal of Urban Economics, 43, 1998, 244-257 
 
Devarajan, Shantayanan, Vinaya Swaroop and Heng-fu Zou. "Composition of public 
spending and economic growth", Journal of Monetary Economics, 37, 1996, 313-344. 
 
 48
Gauthier, Isabelle and François Vaillancourt. Déconcentration, délégation et dévolution: 
nature, choix et mise en place, mimeo, World Bank Institute, 2002. 
 
Huther, Jeff and Anwar Shah. Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the 
Debate on Fiscal Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper No 1894, World 
Bank, Washington, March 1998 
 
Levine, Ross and David Renelt. "A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth 
regressions", American Economic Review, 82, 1992, 942-963. 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Robert M. McNab. "Fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth", World Development, 31(9), 2003, 1597-1616. 
 
Meloche, Jean-Philippe, Vaillancourt, François and Serdar Yilmaz. Decentralization or 
Fiscal Autonomy? What Does Really Matter?, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No 3254, World Bank: Washington, March 2004 
 
Musgrave, Richard A. The theory of public finance, McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1959 
 
_________________. "Devolution, grants and fiscal competition", Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 11, 1997, 65-72. 
 
Oates, Wallace E. Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1972 
 
Oates, William E. and Robert M. Schwab. "The Allocative and Distributive Implications 
of Local Fiscal Competition", in Competition among States and Local Governments:  
Efficiency and Equity in American Federalism, Kenyon, D.A. and Kincaid, J. (eds.), 
The Urban Institute Press, 1991, 127-145. 
 
Rosenbaum, Allan. "Gouvernance et décentralisation : leçons de l’expérience", Revue 
française d’administration publique, n° 88, 1998, 507-516. 
 49
 
Tiebout, Charles M. "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political Economy, 
64, 1956, 416-424. 
 
Vaillancourt, François and Philippe Wingender. "Decentralisation, inter-governmental 
competition/emulation and efficiency:  Lessons from and for the transport sector", 
Round Table 130 on Transport and Decentralisation, OECD, Paris, September 2004. 
 
_____________. "The Effect of Inter-jurisdictional Competition on Regulation and vice 
versa: the case of Canada", Paper prepared for The Effect of Inter-jurisdictional 
Competition on Regulation Conference, Heidelberg, June 2005. 
 
World Bank. World Development Report,  New York, Oxford University Press, 2001 
 
Xie, Danyang, Heng-fu Zou and Hamid Davoodi. "Fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth in the United States", Journal of Urban Economics, (45), 1999, 228-239. 
 
Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszkowski. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation and the 
underprovision of local public goods", Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 1986, 356–
370. 
 50
Annex 1 – Growth model calculations 
 
The discounted utility maximization problem for the representative individual is given by 
dtecU tρ
σ
σ
−∞
−∫ − −= 0
1
1
1     objective function   (A.1) 
( ) ( ) clpfkcy
dt
dkk −−=−−=≡ ωγβαττ 11&  budget constraint   (A.2) 
10 =k       initial condition   (A.3) 
0lim =−∞→
t
t
ek ρλ      terminal condition   (A.4) 
 
To solve the optimization problem, we set up the Hamiltonian 
( )[ ]clpfkecH t −−+− −= −
−
ωγβαρ
σ
τλσ 11
11  
And we take the derivative with respect to consumption c and capital stock k. The first-
order conditions are given by  
00 =−⇒=∂∂ −− λρσ teccH     (A.5) 
( ) λατλλ ωγβα && −=−⇒=+∂∂ − lpfkkH 110    (A.6) 
 
By taking the log and the time derivative of (A.5), we obtain 
λ
λρσ && =−−
c
c         (A.7) 
where 
dt
dcc ≡&  and 
dt
dλλ ≡&  
( ) λ
λατ ωγβα &−=− − lpfk 11  
 
From these two first-order conditions and using both the initial and terminal 
conditions to determinate the equation system, we find the growth rate of per capita 
consumption which is the same as the capital and the output growth rate. The growth rate 
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of the economy can also be expressed as a function of the shares for federal, provincial 
and local government of aggregated government spending. 
( )[ ]ρατσ ωγβα −−== − lpfkccyy 111&&  
( )[ ]ρατσ ωλβα −−=≡ − lpfkydtdyyy 111&  
   ( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−= − ρατσ ααωαγαβαα
1
111 lpfk  
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In order to find the growth-maximizing shares, we need to optimize the growth rate 
equation with respect to all three shares of government spending under the constraint 
1=++ lpf θθθ .  
( ) ( )1,,, −++−⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −∆= lpflpflpfL θθθλσρθθθλθθθ αωαγαβ  
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with ( )( )
( )
σ
ττα αα−−−≡∆
1
11  
The first-order conditions are given by 
00
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010 =−++⇒=∂∂ ∗∗∗ lpfL θθθλ    (A.11) 
From (A.8) and (A.9), we have 
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From (A.9) and (A.10) 
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Using (A.13), we have 
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γ
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+
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 and ωγβ
γθ ++=
∗
p  
and from (A.12)    ωγβ
βθ ++=
∗
f  
We therefore find the growth-maximizing shares of spending by the federal, provincial 
and local governments.  ωγβ
βθ ++=
∗
f ,  ωγβ
γθ ++=
∗
p ,  ωγβ
ωθ ++=
∗
l  
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Annex 2 – Provincial time-series regressions 
 
Table A.1 
Regression results for Newfoundland 1965-2004 
Dependant variable : per capita provincial GDP growth 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TXRT -0.20 - - - - -0.17 -0.16 
 [-0.80] - - - - [-0.68] [-0.63] 
SPENDTOT - -0.33 -0.28 -0.15 -0.39 - - 
 - [-1.10] [-0.76] [-0.44] [-1.21] - - 
RI -0.22 - - - - - - 
 [0.25] - - - - - - 
PI - -0.21 - - - - - 
 - [-1.21] - - - - - 
MUNI - - -0.35 -0.45 - - - 
 - - [-0.65] [-0.84] - - - 
SCHOOL - - -0.18 - -0.21 - - 
 - - [-0.89] - [-1.04] - - 
PRI - - - - - -0.28 - 
 - - - - - [-0.88] - 
AI - - - - - - 0.11 
 - - - - - - [0.34] 
∆POP -1.63 -1.29 -1.41 -1.85 -1.20 -1.22 -1.71 
 [-1.17] [-1.02] [-1.04] [-1.46] [-0.92] [-0.85] [-1.27] 
EDUC 0.21 0.31 0.32 0.21 0.28 0.30 0.23 
 [0.86] [1.29] [1.29] [0.98] [1.17] [1.15] [0.90] 
INV -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 
 [-0.09] [-0.39] [-0.40] [-0.10] [-0.27] [-0.30] [0.06] 
OPEN(2) -13.45 -2.09 -4.58 -13.25 -0.41 -10.98 -12.36 
 [-0.95] [-0.12] [-0.24] [-0.79] [-0.02] [-0.79] [-0.83] 
CONS 0.30 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.19 0.29 0.19 
 [1.25] [1.15] [1.16] [1.35] [1.00] [1.54] [0.68] 
Adj. R-square 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Table A.2 
Regression results for Prince-Edward-Island 1965-2004 
Dependant variable : per capita provincial GDP growth 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TXRT 0.03 - - - - 0.31 0.30 
 [0.10] - - - - [0.74] [0.83] 
SPENDTOT - -0.27 -0.26 -0.2 -0.32 - - 
 - [-0.84] [-0.79] [-0.85] [-1.06] - - 
RI 0.14 - - - - - - 
 [0.23] - - - - - - 
PI - -0.02 - - - - - 
 - [-0.10] - - - - - 
MUNI - - 0.23 0.25 - - - 
 - - [0.48] [0.55] - - - 
SCHOOL - - -0.05 - -0.08 - - 
 - - [-0.25] - [-0.36] - - 
PRI - - - - - 0.41 - 
 - - - - - [1.02] - 
AI - - - - - - 0.12 
 - - - - - - [1.33] 
∆POP -0.33 0.09 0.23 0.26 0.09 0.02 -0.50 
 [-0.21] [0.06] [0.15] [0.17] [0.06] [0.01] [-0.33] 
EDUC -0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.26 -0.27 
 [-0.14] [-0.07] [0.17] [0.17] [-0.02] [-0.57] [-0.62] 
INV -0.22 -0.30 -0.28 -0.25 -0.32 -0.09 -0.16 
 [-0.91] [-1.09] [-0.99] [1.00] [-1.25] [-0.31] [-0.67] 
OPEN(2) -71.92 -90.02 -96.59 -85.56 -101.03 -81.07 -90.98 
 [-1.17] [-1.52] [-1.58] [-2.05]** [-1.70]* [-1.33] [-1.49] 
CONS 0.27 0.47 0.46 0.39 0.54 0.11 0.25 
 [1.02] [1.27] [1.25] [1.82]* [1.58] [0.42] [1.37] 
Adj. R-square -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Table A.3 
Regression results for Nova Scotia 1965-2004 
Dependant variable : per capita provincial GDP growth 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TXRT -0.43 - - - - -0.21 -0.31 
 [-2.19]** - - - - [-1.04] [-1.48] 
SPENDTOT - -0.13 -0.20 -0.33 -0.14 - - 
 - [-0.94] [-1.30] [-2.11]** [-0.89] - - 
RI -0.25 - - - - - - 
 [-0.68] - - - - - - 
PI - 0.29 - - - - - 
 - [2.27]** - - - - - 
MUNI - - 0.69 0.13 - - - 
 - - [1.76]* [0.37] - - - 
SCHOOL - - 0.33 - 0.20 - - 
 - - [2.49]** - [1.75]* - - 
PRI - - - - - 0.17 - 
 - - - - - [0.57] - 
AI - - - - - - 0.00 
 - - - - - - [0.04] 
∆POP -0.56 -2.06 -1.50 -0.29 -1.99 -1.58 -1.06 
 [-0.35] [-1.33] [-0.92] [-0.17] [-1.20] [-0.94] [-0.74] 
EDUC 0.03 -0.10 -0.20 -0.22 -0.07 0.05 0.06 
 [0.16] [-0.54] [-0.95] [-0.93] [-0.33] [0.25] [0.29] 
INV -0.18 -0.12 -0.07 -0.04 -0.13 -0.16 -0.17 
 [-1.15] [-0.79] [-0.45] [-0.25] [-0.83] [-0.99] [-1.01] 
OPEN(2) -12.51 -7.24 -8.36 -9.96 -7.19 -9.21 -10.79 
 [-2.51]** [-1.69]* [-1.90]* [-2.13]** [-1.60] [-1.79] [-2.45]**
CONS 0.59 0.17 0.14 0.40 0.24 0.31 0.44 
 [2.28]** [1.01] [0.84] [2.78]*** [1.46] [1.14] [2.30]**
Adj. R-square 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.17 
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Table A.4 
Regression results for New Brunswick 1965-2004 
Dependant variable : per capita provincial GDP growth 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TXRT -0.14 - - - - -0.21 -0.14 
 [-0.49] - - - - [-0.71] [-0.90] 
SPENDTOT - -0.15 -0.59 -0.50 -0.06 - - 
 - [-0.28] [-1.03] [-1.55] [-0.12] - - 
RI 0.01 - - - - - - 
 [0.03] - - - - - - 
PI - 0.00 - - - - - 
 - [0.04] - - - - - 
MUNI - - -1.51 -1.46 - - - 
 - - [-1.65] [-1.69]* - - - 
SCHOOL - - -0.02 - 0.03 - - 
 - - [-0.19] - [0.25] - - 
PRI - - - - - -0.03 - 
 - - - - - [-0.23] - 
AI - - - - - - -0.11 
 - - - - - - [-0.91] 
∆POP -0.89 -0.70 -0.66 -0.6 -0.62 -1.05 -1.23 
 [-0.54] [-0.44] [-0.43] [-0.40] [-0.39] [-0.63] [-0.78] 
EDUC -0.12 -0.21 -0.53 -0.44 -0.11 -0.19 -0.25 
 [-0.23] [-0.32] [-0.81] [-1.06] [-0.17] [-0.39] [0.60] 
INV -0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 
 [-0.16] [-0.11] [0.58] [0.60] [-0.07] [-0.19] [-0.38] 
OPEN(2) -10.79 -11.65 -18.03 -17.34 -11.12 -10.95 -8.70 
 [-0.86] [-0.89] [-1.35] [-1.37] [-0.86] [-0.87] [-0.69] 
CONS 0.31 0.33 0.75 0.69 0.28 0.35 0.36 
 [0.96] [0.81] [1.61] [1.97]* [0.73] [1.11] [1.31] 
Adj. R-square -0.10 -0.12 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Table A.5 
Regression results for Quebec 1965-2004 
Dependant variable : per capita provincial GDP growth 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TXRT -0.04 - - - - 0.03 -0.24 
 [-0.12] - - - - [0.08] [-0.84] 
SPENDTOT - -0.35 -0.44 -0.55 -0.29 - - 
 - [-1.48] [-1.65] [-2.39]** [-1.18] - - 
RI 0.54 - - - - - - 
 [1.62] - - - - - - 
PI - 0.08 - - - - - 
 - [0.62] - - - - - 
MUNI - - -0.600 -0.68 - - - 
 - - [-1.27] [-1.48] - - - 
SCHOOL - - 0.12 - 0.16 - - 
 - - [0.76] - [1.05] - - 
PRI - - - - - 0.33 - 
 - - - - - [1.37] - 
AI - - - - - - 0.06 
 - - - - - - [0.81] 
∆POP -0.19 -0.82 -1.08 -1.51 -0.66 0.28 -0.93 
 [-0.17] [-0.60] [-0.81] [-1.26] [-0.51] [0.24] [-0.65] 
EDUC 0.06 -0.67 -0.87 -0.88 -0.69 -0.33 -0.22 
 [0.16] [-1.83]* [-2.25]** [-2.30]** [-1.90]* [-0.87] [-0.59] 
INV -0.43 -0.53 -0.59 -0.62 -0.50 -0.53 -0.48 
 [-2.16]* [-2.97] [-3.14]*** [-3.33]*** [-2.84]*** [-2.88]*** [-2.19]**
OPEN(2) -1.13 -0.80 -1.56 -0.96 -1.16 -1.29 -0.03 
 [-1.04] [-0.73] [-1.41] [-1.24] [-1.08] [-1.04] [-0.04] 
CONS 0.23 0.47 0.81 0.76 0.52 0.35 0.23 
 [0.77] [1.90] [2.44]** [2.35]** [2.15]** [1.17] [0.74] 
Adj. R-square 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.23 
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Table A.6 
Regression results for Ontario 1965-2004 
Dependant variable : per capita provincial GDP growth 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TXRT -0.04 - - - - 0.16 -0.06 
 [-0.12] - - - - [0.44] [-0.25] 
SPENDTOT - 0.21 0.29 -0.34 0.33 - - 
 - [0.47] [0.66] [-1.02] [0.85] - - 
RI 0.19 - - - - - - 
 [0.55] - - - - - - 
PI - 0.32 - - - - - 
 - [1.37] - - - - - 
MUNI - - -0.07 -0.17 - - - 
 - - [-0.20] [-0.50] - - - 
SCHOOL - - 0.58 - 0.59 - - 
 - - [2.09]** - [2.18]** - - 
PRI - - - - - 0.37 - 
 - - - - - [1.25] - 
AI - - - - - - 0.31 
 - - - - - - [2.14] 
∆POP -0.11 -0.44 -1.65 0.35 -1.63 -0.31 0.31 
 [-0.06] [-0.31] [-1.06] [0.28] [-1.07] [-0.19] [0.21] 
EDUC 0.21 0.22 -0.29 0.08 -0.24 0.21 0.31 
 [0.93] [0.98] [-0.76] [0.21] [-0.82] [0.94] [1.43] 
INV -0.62 -0.53 -0.36 -0.81 -0.34 -0.54 -0.65 
 [-2.01]* [-1.81]* [-1.16] [-3.56]*** [-1.16] [-1.94]* [-2.92]**
OPEN(2) -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.39 -0.26 -0.39 -0.64 
 [-0.65] [-0.83] [-0.84] [-1.20] [-0.83] [-0.94] [-1.51] 
CONS 0.19 -0.01 0.00 0.45 -0.04 0.04 0.23 
 [0.77] [-0.02] [0.00] [2.07] [-0.16] [0.15] [1.87] 
Adj. R-square 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.20 0.30 0.23 0.29 
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Table A.7 
Regression results for Manitoba 1965-2004 
Dependant variable : per capita provincial GDP growth 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TXRT 0.40 - - - - 0.37 -0.01 
 [0.88] - - - - [0.80] [-0.01] 
SPENDTOT - 0.09 0.19 0.10 -0.15 - - 
 - [0.17] [0.34] [0.19] [-0.33] - - 
RI 0.79 - - - - - - 
 [2.01]* - - - - - - 
PI - 0.24 - - - - - 
 - [1.06] - - - - - 
MUNI - - 0.52 0.57 - - - 
 - - [1.02] [1.15] - - - 
SCHOOL - - 0.13 - 0.19 - - 
 - - [0.42] - [0.66] - - 
PRI - - - - - 0.47 - 
 - - - - - [1.85]* - 
AI - - - - - - 0.14 
 - - - - - - [0.98] 
∆POP -0.62 0.25 0.36 0.34 0.10 -0.06 -0.02 
 [-0.43] [0.17] [0.24] [0.23] [0.07] [-0.04] [-0.02] 
EDUC 0.52 0.31 0.62 0.77 0.16 0.16 0.54 
 [1.25] [0.91] [1.00] [1.52] [0.38] [0.37] [1.23] 
INV -0.20 -0.10 -0.08 -0.12 -0.16 -0.05 -0.31 
 [-0.88] [-0.39] [-0.33] [-0.49] [-0.67] [-0.22] [-1.20] 
OPEN(2) -1.24 -0.61 -0.74 -0.14 0.38 0.81 2.1 
 [-0.19] [-0.14] [-0.17] [-0.03] [0.09] [0.13] [0.32] 
CONS -0.32 -0.11 -0.18 -0.16 0 -0.33 -0.12 
 [-0.86] [-0.42] [-0.62] [-0.57] [-0.02] [-0.88] [-0.33] 
Adj. R-square 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 -0.01 
Obs. 39 39 29 39 39 39 39 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Table A.7 
Regression results for Saskatchewan 1965-2004 
Dependant variable : per capita provincial GDP growth 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TXRT 0.63 - - - - 1.06 -0.32 
 [1.20] - - - - [1.76]* [-0.81] 
SPENDTOT - 0.75 1.22 0.60 0.07 - - 
 - [0.97] [1.43] [0.78] [0.10] - - 
RI 1.13 - - - - - - 
 [2.24]** - - - - - - 
PI - 0.57 - - - - - 
 - [2.13]** - - - - - 
MUNI - - 1.30 1.20 - - - 
 - - [2.08]** [1.88]* - - - 
SCHOOL - - 0.45 - 0.39 - - 
 - - [1.61] - [1.34] - - 
PRI - - - - - 1.29 - 
 - - - - - [2.66]** - 
AI - - - - - - 0.03 
 - - - - - - [0.10] 
∆POP -1.07 -0.62 -0.96 -2.52 -1.29 -1.29 -1.53 
 [-0.55] [-0.33] [-0.51] [-1.53] [-0.65] [-0.68] [-0.69] 
EDUC 0.71 0.45 0.66 0.23 0.06 0.41 0.02 
 [0.95] [0.58] [0.83] [0.30] [0.08] [0.61] [0.03] 
INV -0.23 -0.13 -0.08 -0.01 -0.13 -0.22 -0.08 
 [-0.96] [-0.55] [-0.32] [-0.03] [-0.51] [-0.97] [-0.33] 
OPEN(2) -0.41 -1.48 0.09 -0.01 -2.63 0.61 -3.77 
 [-0.08] [-0.31] [0.02] [0.00] [-0.53] [0.13] [-0.71] 
CONS -0.51 -0.38 -0.68 -0.35 0.02 -0.86 0.28 
 [-1.11] [-0.86] [-1.37] [-0.76] [0.05] [-1.67]* [0.60] 
Adj. R-square 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.20 0.02 
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Table A.9 
Regression results for Alberta 1965-2004 
Dependant variable : per capita provincial GDP growth 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TXRT -0.73 - - - - -0.24 -0.04 
 [-1.13] - - - - [-0.52] [-0.11] 
SPENDTOT - -1.60 -1.50 -0.85 -1.25 - - 
 - [-1.49] [-1.35] [-1.17] [-1.15] - - 
RI -0.80 - - - - - - 
 [-1.49] - - - - - - 
PI - -0.49 - - - - - 
 - [-1.25] - - - - - 
MUNI - - -0.75 -0.78 - - - 
 - - [-1.00] [-1.05] - - - 
SCHOOL - - -0.38 - -0.40 - - 
 - - [-0.77] - [-0.83] - - 
PRI - - - - - -0.34 - 
 - - - - - [-1.06] - 
AI - - - - - - -0.27 
 - - - - - - [0.97] 
∆POP 2.31 2.64 2.46 2.08 2.70 2.57 2.35 
 [1.62] [1.89]* [1.65] [1.49] [1.83]* [1.71]* [1.60] 
EDUC 0.36 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.53 0.41 0.30 
 [0.84] [1.22] [1.03] [0.94] [1.37] [0.94] [0.67] 
INV -0.64 -0.85 -0.80 -0.66 -0.83 -0.49 -0.59 
 [-1.80]* [-2.10]** [-1.86]* [-1.71]* [-1.95]* [-1.42] [-1.62] 
OPEN(2) -1.88 -2.71 -2.47 -1.49 -2.36 -1.83 -1.67 
 [-1.86]* [-2.24]** [-1.82]* [-3.04]*** [-1.74]* [-1.74]* [-1.64] 
CONS 0.82 0.97 0.93 0.58 0.74 0.48 0.45 
 [1.94]* [1.83]* [1.71]* [2.00]** [1.45] [1.74]* [1.67] 
Adj. R-square 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Table A.10 
Regression results for British Columbia 1965-2004 
Dependant variable : per capita provincial GDP growth 
Indep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TXRT 1.19 - - - - 1.60 0.44 
 [2.30]** - - - - [2.92]*** [0.98] 
SPENDTOT - 0.33 0.42 -0.09 0.46 - - 
 - [0.70] [0.74] [-0.23] [0.83] - - 
RI 0.70 - - - - - - 
 [2.27]** - - - - - - 
PI - 0.34 - - - - - 
 - [1.31] - - - - - 
MUNI - - 0.22 0.18 - - - 
 - - [0.43] [0.35] - - - 
SCHOOL - - 0.38 - 0.37 - - 
 - - [1.27] - [1.26] - - 
PRI - - - - - 0.88 - 
 - - - - - [2.93]*** - 
AI - - - - - - -0.08 
 - - - - - - [-0.59] 
∆POP -0.75 -0.17 -0.13 0.13 0.00 -1.52 -0.28 
 [-0.71] [-0.16] [-0.11] [0.11] [0.00] [-1.41] [-0.24] 
EDUC -0.69 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 -1.07 -0.45 
 [-1.36] [0.26] [0.23] [0.18] [0.18] [-2.05]** [-0.84] 
INV 0.22 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.12 0.41 0.30 
 [0.76] [-0.21] [-0.30] [-0.06] [-0.46] [1.40] [0.82] 
OPEN(2) -2.79 0.13 0.02 -0.81 -0.33 -2.61 -2.94 
 [-1.79]* [0.10] [0.02] [-0.63] [-0.28] [-1.75]* [-1.75]* 
CONS -0.25 -0.21 -0.20 0.09 -0.12 -0.54 0.22 
 [-1.22] [-0.72] [-0.65] [0.44] [-0.50] [-2.11]** [1.52] 
Adj. R-square 0.11 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.19 -0.02 
Obs. 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM II) 
The t-statistics are given in brackets. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(*), 5(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Annex 3 – Dependant and control variables mean and standard-deviation 
 
Table A.11 
Dependant and control variables mean and standard-deviation 
Source: compilation by the author 
 
Provinces 
tyln∆  )0(ln y  TXRT EXPEND ∆POP EDUC INV     OPEN OPEN(2) 
NFD 0.04 
[0.05] 
9.54 
[0.40] 
0.55 
[1.53] 
0.29 
[0.05] 
0.00 
[0.01] 
0.18 
[0.05] 
0.33 
[0.09] - 
0.01 
[0.00] 
PEI 0.03 
[0.05] 
9.52 
[0.39] 
0.56 
[1.48] 
0.33 
[0.04] 
0.01 
[0.01] 
0.11 
[0.03] 
0.23 
[0.05] - 
0.00 
[0.00] 
NS 0.03 
[0.03] 
9.67 
[0.32] 
0.58 
[1.49] 
0.34 
[0.04] 
0.01 
[0.00] 
0.11 
[0.03] 
0.26 
[0.04] - 
0.02 
[0.00] 
NB 0.03 
[0.05] 
9.65 
[0.34] 
0.57 
[1.49] 
0.27 
[0.03] 
0.01 
[0.01] 
0.12 
[0.02] 
0.28 
[0.07] - 
0.02 
[0.00] 
QUE 0.02 
[0.03] 
9.90 
[0.25] 
0.60 
[1.51] 
0.21 
[0.04] 
0.01 
[0.01] 
0.15 
[0.01] 
0.22 
[0.02] - 
0.23 
[0.02] 
ONT 0.02 
[0.03] 
10.12 
[0.22] 
0.59 
[1.53] 
0.18 
[0.02] 
0.02 
[0.01] 
0.12 
[0.02] 
0.23 
[0.02] - 
0.40 
[0.02] 
MAN 0.02 
[0.03] 
9.90 
[0.24] 
0.58 
[1.51] 
0.22 
[0.03] 
0.01 
[0.00] 
0.11 
[0.02] 
0.24 
[0.04] - 
0.04 
[0.00] 
SASK 0.03 
[0.08] 
9.94 
[0.28] 
0.58 
[1.53] 
0.20 
[0.03] 
0.00 
[0.01] 
0.13 
[0.02] 
0.30 
[0.05] - 
0.04 
[0.01] 
ALTA 0.03 
[0.07] 
10.34 
[0.25] 
0.59 
[1.59] 
0.16 
[0.02] 
0.02 
[0.01] 
0.15 
[0.03] 
0.32 
[0.05] - 
0.11 
[0.01] 
BC 0.02 
[0.04] 
10.04 
[0.21] 
0.59 
[1.52] 
0.18 
[0.03] 
0.02 
[0.01] 
0.13 
[0.02] 
0.27 
[0.04] - 
0.11 
[0.01] 
CAN 0.02 
[0.02] - 
0.38 
[0.05] 
0.22 
[0.02] 
0.01 
[0.00] 
0.10 
[0.03] 
0.20 
[0.02] 
0.27 
[0.09] - 
